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Incentive compatibility constraints as an explanation for the use of prison sentences instead of fines

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Author Info
Levitt, Steven D.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V7M-3SX0D9N-3/2/299f176c032c2047df7092a58a1997af
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 179-192
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:2:p:179-192

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  1. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe," NBER Working Papers 10760, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2007. "Optimal Law Enforcement when the Offender can Dispose of his Wealth," Review of Law & Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(2), pages 3. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alexander Klein, 2000. "Jail or Fine - Let Them Choose," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0337, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  5. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable," NBER Working Papers 10761, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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