IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jincot/v18y2018i1d10.1007_s10842-017-0252-5.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Contract Enforcement and Trade

Author

Listed:
  • Azmat Gani

    (College of Economics and Political Science)

Abstract

The main objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of contract enforcement on trade in a large sample of developing economies. The effects of three separate measures capturing contract enforcement (the time required to enforce a contract; the costs to enforce a contract; and the number of procedures required to enforce a contract) on trade were tested using the panel corrected standard errors method of estimation. The results show that the three measures of contract enforcement are negatively and statistically significantly correlated with trade. The findings lead to the conclusion that the ease of contract enforcement is crucial in order to facilitate the speed of trade in the developing group of countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Azmat Gani, 2018. "Contract Enforcement and Trade," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 107-119, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:18:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10842-017-0252-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-017-0252-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10842-017-0252-5
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10842-017-0252-5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    2. Andrei A. Levchenko, 2007. "Institutional Quality and International Trade," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 791-819.
    3. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 133-148, April.
    4. Ari Van Assche & Galina A. Schwartz, 2013. "Contracting Institutions and Ownership Structure in International Joint Ventures," CIRANO Working Papers 2013s-04, CIRANO.
    5. Avinash Dixit, 2009. "Governance Institutions and Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 5-24, March.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    7. Gani, Azmat & Scrimgeour, Frank, 2016. "New Zealand's trade with Asia and the role of good governance," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 36-53.
    8. Nathan Nunn, 2007. "Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 569-600.
    9. Francois, Joseph & Manchin, Miriam, 2013. "Institutions, Infrastructure, and Trade," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 165-175.
    10. Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 131-165, June.
    11. Williamson, Oliver, 2009. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 111-134, December.
    12. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Henri L. F. De Groot & Gert‐Jan Linders & Piet Rietveld & Uma Subramanian, 2004. "The Institutional Determinants of Bilateral Trade Patterns," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 103-123, February.
    14. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Van Assche, Ari & Schwartz, Galina A., 2013. "Contracting institutions and ownership structure in international joint ventures," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 124-132.
    16. James Anderson, 2009. "Does trade foster contract enforcement?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(1), pages 105-130, October.
    17. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 2002. "Insecurity And The Pattern Of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 342-352, May.
    18. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    19. Azmat Gani, 2011. "Governance and Growth in Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(1), pages 19-40.
    20. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S. & Huck, Steffen, 2001. "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(1), pages 131-144, March.
    21. Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, "undated". "Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1011, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
    22. Daron Acemoglu & Pol Antràs & Elhanan Helpman, 2007. "Contracts and Technology Adoption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 916-943, June.
    23. Dani Rodrik, 2007. "Introductiion to One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth," Introductory Chapters, in: One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth, Princeton University Press.
    24. Nuno Garoupa, 1997. "The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-295, September.
    25. Era Dabla‐Norris & Scott Freeman, 2004. "Enforcement of Property Rights and Underdevelopment," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 391-405, August.
    26. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Accuracy in the Determination of Liability," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, April.
    27. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-295, September.
    28. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-287, April.
    29. Matthias Helble & Ben Shepherd & John S. Wilson, 2009. "Transparency and Regional Integration in the Asia Pacific," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 479-508, March.
    30. Priya Ranjan & Jae Young Lee, 2007. "Contract Enforcement And International Trade," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 191-218, July.
    31. Douglass C. North, 2005. "Introduction to Understanding the Process of Economic Change," Introductory Chapters, in: Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press.
    32. Yu, Miaojie, 2010. "Trade, democracy, and the gravity equation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 289-300, March.
    33. Ma, Yue & Qu, Baozhi & Zhang, Yifan, 2010. "Judicial quality, contract intensity and trade: Firm-level evidence from developing and transition countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 146-159, June.
    34. World Bank, 2013. "World Development Indicators 2013," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13191, December.
    35. Nicola Gennaioli, 2013. "Optimal Contracts With Enforcement Risk," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 59-82, February.
    36. James E. Rauch, 2001. "Business and Social Networks in International Trade," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1177-1203, December.
    37. Moenius, Johannes & Berkowitz, Daniel, 2011. "Law, trade, and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 451-460, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gani, Azmat & Scrimgeour, Frank, 2016. "New Zealand's trade with Asia and the role of good governance," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 36-53.
    2. Gani, Azmat & Clemes, Michael D., 2016. "Does the strength of the legal systems matter for trade in insurance and financial services?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 511-519.
    3. Carlos Abreo & Ricardo Bustillo & Carlos Rodriguez, 2021. "The role of institutional quality in the international trade of a Latin American country: evidence from Colombian export performance," Journal of Economic Structures, Springer;Pan-Pacific Association of Input-Output Studies (PAPAIOS), vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, December.
    4. Das, Joy & Tanger, Shaun & Fannin, J. Matthew & Kennedy, P. Lynn, 2020. "Institutional Determinant of Market Concentration and Trade in a General Equilibrium Setup," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304458, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 403-454, Elsevier.
    6. Bah, Mamadou & Atangana Ondoa, Henri & Kpognon, Koffi Délali, 2021. "Effects of governance quality on exports in Sub-Saharan Africa," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 1-14.
    7. Yu, Shu & Beugelsdijk, Sjoerd & de Haan, Jakob, 2015. "Trade, trust and the rule of law," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 102-115.
    8. Ferguson, Shon & Formai, Sara, 2013. "Institution-driven comparative advantage and organizational choice," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 193-200.
    9. Wenni Lei & Yuwei Luo, 2022. "Institutions Rule in Export Diversity," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(18), pages 1-14, September.
    10. Francois, Joseph & Manchin, Miriam, 2013. "Institutions, Infrastructure, and Trade," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 165-175.
    11. Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin & Giray Gozgor & Chi Keung Marco Lau, 2017. "Institutions and gravity model: the role of political economy and corporate governance," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 7(3), pages 421-436, December.
    12. Karam, Fida & Zaki, Chahir, 2019. "Why Don’t MENA Countries Trade More? The Curse of Deficient Institutions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 56-77.
    13. Kuncic, Aljaz, 2012. "Institutional determinants of bilateral trade: Taking another look," Kiel Advanced Studies Working Papers 462, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    14. Beck, T.H.L., 2010. "Legal Institutions and Economic Development," Other publications TiSEM 8aa07b48-ce55-4cf6-8754-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Prabir De, 2010. "Governance, Institutions, and Regional Infrastructure in Asia," Working Papers id:3029, eSocialSciences.
    16. Abeliansky, Ana & Krenz, Astrid, 2015. "Democracy and international trade: Differential effects from a panel quantile regression framework," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 243, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    17. Andrei A. Levchenko, 2013. "International Trade and Institutional Change," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1145-1181, October.
    18. Araujo, Luis & Mion, Giordano & Ornelas, Emanuel, 2016. "Institutions and export dynamics," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 2-20.
    19. Christian Volpe Martincus & Andrés Gallo, 2009. "Institutions and Export Specialization: Just Direct Effects?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 129-149, February.
    20. Lanz, Rainer & Lee, Woori & Stolzenburg, Victor, 2019. "Distance, formal and informal institutions in international trade," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2019-03, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:18:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10842-017-0252-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.