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The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract

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Author Info
Oliver E. Williamson

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Abstract

This paper describes the firm not as a production function (which is a black box construction) but as a governance structure (which is an organizational construction). This is accomplished by examining economic organization through the lens of contract rather than through the more traditional lens of choice. Firm and market are viewed in a comparative institutional way as alternative modes of governance, where governance serves the three-part purpose of infusing order, thereby to mitigate potential conflict and realize mutual gains. Transaction cost economizing drives much of the argument. Refutable implications, empirical testing and public policy ramifications all accrue to this setup.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 16 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
Pages: 171-195
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:16:y:2002:i:3:p:171-195

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  1. Christian Cordes & Peter J. Richerson & Richard McElreath & Pontus Strimling, 2006. "How Does Opportunistic Behavior Influence Firm Size?," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2006-18, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group. [Downloadable!]
  2. Oliver E. Williamson, 2005. "The Economics of Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 1-18, May. [Downloadable!]
  3. Lowell R. Jacobsen, 2004. "Whither franchising? The case of Avis Europe PLC," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(8), pages 525-535. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jinyang Hua & Paul Miesing & Mingfang Li, 2006. "An Empirical Taxonomy of SOE Governance in Transitional China," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 401-433, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Breno Pascualote Lemos & Rodrigo Ayres Padilha & José Luís Oreiro, 2005. "Análise das condições de estabilidade de um modelo macrodinâmico Walrasiano sob diferentes regras de política monetária," Working Papers 0028, Universidade Federal do Paraná, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Janis Kapler, . "The Theory of the Firm, the Theory of Competition and the Transnational Corporation," Working Papers 6, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Adrian Bridge & Clem Tisdell, 2006. "The determinants of the vertical boundaries of the construction firm: response," Construction Management & Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 233-236, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Fritz Rahmeyer, 2006. "From a Routine-Based to a Knowledge-Based View: Towards an Evolutionary Theory of the Firm," Discussion Paper Series 283, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. U. Witt, 2005. "Firms as Realizations of Entrepreneurial Visions," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2005-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
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  13. Fumiko Hayashi & Rick Sullivan & Stuart E. Weiner, . "A guide to the ATM and debit card industry - 2006 update," Monograph, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, number 2006agttaadci2. [Downloadable!]
  14. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse7_2006, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Jose Maria Liberti, 2004. "Initiative, Incentives and Soft Information. How Does Delegation Impact The Role of Bank Relationship Managers?," Finance 0404023, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  17. Paul Milgrom & Eva M Meyersson Milgrom & Ravi Singh, 2007. "When Should Control Be Shared?," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000050, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Doris Neuberger, 2005. "What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm," Finance 0503001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  19. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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