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Does Trade Foster Contract Enforcement?

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  • James E. Anderson

Abstract

Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14045.

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Date of creation: May 2008
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Publication status: published as James Anderson, 2009. "Does trade foster contract enforcement?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 105-130, October.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14045

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References

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  1. Maurice Schiff & L. Alan Winters, 2003. "Regional Integration and Development," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15172.
  2. James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2004. "Trade Costs," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(3), pages 691-751, September.
  3. Schiff, Maurice & Winters, L. Alan, 1997. "Regional Integration as Diplomacy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1690, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Ricardo J. Caballero & Mohamad L. Hammour, 1998. "The Macroeconomics of Specificity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 724-767, August.
  5. Anderson, James E. & Bandiera, Oriana, 2006. "Traders, cops and robbers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 197-215, September.
  6. Dani Rodrik, 1997. "Has Globalization Gone Too Far?," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 57.
  7. repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, S.J., 1999. "Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 418, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 03 Aug 2000.
  9. James E. Anderson, 2005. "Economic Integration and the Civilizing Commerce Hypothesis," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 673, Boston College Department of Economics.
  10. James E. Rauch & Vitor Trindade, 2003. "Information, International Substitutability, and Globalization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 775-791, June.
  11. Baier, Scott L. & Bergstrand, Jeffrey H., 2001. "The growth of world trade: tariffs, transport costs, and income similarity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-27, February.
  12. Anderson James E & Young Leslie, 2006. "Trade and Contract Enforcement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-36, November.
  13. James E. Rauch & Vitor Trindade, 2002. "Ethnic Chinese Networks In International Trade," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 116-130, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Daniel Bernhofen & Raymond Riezman, 2009. "Introduction: ‘New directions in international trade theory’," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-3, October.
  2. Ma, Yue & Qu, Baozhi & Zhang, Yifan, 2010. "Judicial quality, contract intensity and trade: Firm-level evidence from developing and transition countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 146-159, June.
  3. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2014. "Efficient contract enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 161-183, January.

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