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Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Innes, Robert
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management .
Volume (Year): 45 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 546-568
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:45:y:2003:i:3:p:546-568Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870
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Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2007.
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