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Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking

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  • Innes, Robert

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 45 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 546-568

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:45:y:2003:i:3:p:546-568

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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References

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  1. Hahn, Robert W., 1982. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," Working Papers 402, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Keeler, Andrew G., 1991. "Noncompliant firms in transferable discharge permit markets: Some extensions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 180-189, September.
  3. Rubin, Jonathan D. & Kling, Catherine, 1993. "An Emission Saved is an Emission Earned: An Empirical Study of Emission Banking for Light-Duty Vehicle Manufacturers," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt3rb1472g, University of California Transportation Center.
  4. Beavis, Brian & Dobbs, Ian, 1987. "Firm behaviour under regulatory control of stochastic environmental wastes by probabilistic constraints," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 112-127, June.
  5. Yates, Andrew J. & Cronshaw, Mark B., 2001. "Pollution Permit Markets with Intertemporal Trading and Asymmetric Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 104-118, July.
  6. Beavis, Brian & Walker, Martin, 1983. "Random wastes, imperfect monitoring and environmental quality standards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 377-387, August.
  7. Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
  8. Kling, Catherine & Rubin, Jonathan, 1997. "Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 101-115, April.
  9. Hennessy, David A. & Roosen, Jutta, 1999. "Stochastic Pollution, Permits, and Merger Incentives," Staff General Research Papers 1700, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  10. Weitzman, Martin L, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 477-91, October.
  11. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1998. "Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 225-241, May.
  12. Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March.
  13. Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1994. "Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 141-162, September.
  14. Stavins, Robert N., 1996. "Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 218-232, March.
  15. Harford, Jon D., 1978. "Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 26-43, March.
  16. Rubin, Jonathan D., 1996. "A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 269-286, November.
  17. Cronshaw, Mark B & Brown-Kruse, Jamie, 1996. "Regulated Firms in Pollution Permit Markets with Banking," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 179-89, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, . "Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy," Discussion Papers 07/01, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
  2. Chevallier, Julien & Etner, Johanna & Jouvet, Pierre-André, 2011. "Bankable emission permits under uncertainty and optimal risk-management rules," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 332-339, December.
  3. Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2004. "Emissions Variability in Tradable Permit Markets with Imperfect Enforcement and Banking," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 917, The University of Melbourne.
  4. John K. Stranlund & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon, 2010. "An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets," Working Papers 2010-3, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
  5. Franz Wirl & Juergen Noll, 2008. "Abatement and Permits when Pollution is Uncertain and Violations are Fined," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(2), pages 299-312, June.
  6. Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2003. "On the Design of Optimal Grandfathering Schemes for Emission Allowances," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-08, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  7. Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & Massetti, Emanuele, 2009. "Banking permits: Economic efficiency and distributional effects," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 382-403, May.
  8. Huang, Ming-Yuan & Alavalapati, Janaki R.R. & Carter, Douglas R. & Langholtz, Matthew H., 2007. "Is the choice of renewable portfolio standards random?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 5571-5575, November.
  9. Vincent Bertrand, 2013. "Modeling of Emission Allowance Markets: A Literature Review," Working Papers 1304, Chaire Economie du Climat.
  10. Hamilton, Stephen F. & Requate, Till, 2012. "Emissions standards and ambient environmental quality standards with stochastic environmental services," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 377-389.
  11. Federico Boffa & Stefano Clò & Alessio D'Amato, 2013. "Environmental policy and incentives to adopt abatement technologies under endogenous uncertainty," Working Papers 5, Department of the Treasury, Ministry of the Economy and of Finance.

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