Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement

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Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement

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Innes, Robert

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Robert Innes

Abstract

Laws often encourage violators to self-report their behavior. This article studies self-reporting enforcement regimes when violators can engage in "avoidance" activities--activities which lower an offender's risk of apprehension and punishment. Avoidance activities impart two advantages to self-reporting enforcement regimes over and above advantages identified in prior work. First, self-reporters do not engage in the costly avoidance activities that they would otherwise undertake. Second, by avoiding avoidance, self-reporting can sometimes permit the government to deter offenses with less enforcement effort. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 17 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 239-56
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:239-56

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Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Paolo Buccirossi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2005. "Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions," Discussion Papers 74, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Leniency policies and illegal transactions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1281-1297, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tim Friehe, 2006. "Fairness and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund, 2005. "An Investigation of Voluntary Discovery and Disclosure of Environmental Violations Using Laboratory Experiments," Working Papers 2005-7, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
Jacob Nussim & Avraham Tabbach, 2008. "(Non)Regulable avoidance and the perils of punishment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 191-208, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Should You Turn Yourself In? The Consequences of Environmental Self-Policing," Working Papers 27, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, revised 13 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Working Papers 26, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
Garoupa, Nuno & Stephen, Frank, 2003. "A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid," CEPR Discussion Papers 4113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
repec:bep:rlecon:4:2008:1:4 is not listed on IDEAS

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