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Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement

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  • Innes, Robert

Abstract

Laws often encourage violators to self-report their behavior. This article studies self-reporting enforcement regimes when violators can engage in "avoidance" activities--activities which lower an offender's risk of apprehension and punishment. Avoidance activities impart two advantages to self-reporting enforcement regimes over and above advantages identified in prior work. First, self-reporters do not engage in the costly avoidance activities that they would otherwise undertake. Second, by avoiding avoidance, self-reporting can sometimes permit the government to deter offenses with less enforcement effort. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Innes, Robert, 2001. "Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 239-256, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:239-56
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