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Playing monopoly in the creek: Imperfect competition, development, and in-stream flows

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  • Janmaat, John

Abstract

Land ownership and control of development in new and frontier cities is often concentrated. Local public goods, such as wetlands and riparian habitats, can be adversely affected by development. Regulatory pressure to protect these local public goods may not emerge until after some development has occurred. When development rights are insecure, an incentive exists to accelerate early development, an incentive that increases with the number of firms. Further, multiple equilibria may exist, which can result in large increases in development for small increases in the number of firms. When firms are uncertain about how the regulator values the local public good, development may be further accelerated and there may be even more equilibria.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.

Volume (Year): 30 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 455-473

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Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:455-473

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569

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