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Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games

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Author Info
Selten, Reinhard

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V88-4582FK5-11/2/5fb45490b666b6113ea758e4514d8afb
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 5 (1983)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 269-363
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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:5:y:1983:i:3:p:269-363

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  1. Bhaskar, V., 1995. "On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests," Discussion Paper 30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Asst. Prof. Yong-Gwan Kim, 1994. "An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments," Game Theory and Information 9403006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "The Coevolution of Trust and Institutions in Anonymous and Non-anonymous Communities," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-07, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  4. Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Splitting The Baby In Two: How To Solve Solomon'S Dilemma When Agents Are Boundedly Rational," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. W. Güth & A. Ockenfels, . "Evolutionary Norm Enforcement," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1999-84, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
    Other versions:
  7. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Stefan Napel, . "Wie Du mir, so ich Dir! - Ökonomische Theorie und Experiment am Beispiel der Reziprozität," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  8. El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1992. "A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games," Working Papers 757, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  9. Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, . "The Coevolution of Morality and Legal Institutions - An indirect evolutionary approach -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Chong Lim Kim & Yong-Gwan Kim, 1993. "The Evolution of Obedience Norms in the Repeated Carrot-and-the Stick Game," Game Theory and Information 9311001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Tony Curson Price, 1997. "Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 588, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  12. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Stefan Napel, 2006. "Population-Dependent Costs of Detecting Trustworthiness - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  13. Maria Vittoria Levati, . "Explaining Private Provision of Public Goods by Conditional Cooperation - An Evoltuionary Approach -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-44, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  14. Friederike Mengel & Axel Ockenfels & Werner Güth, 2006. "The Dynamics of Trust and Trustworthiness on EBay. An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-03, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  15. Werner Güth & Friederike Mengel & Axel Ockenfels, 2007. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation in Online Markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 265-282, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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