This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Rise and Decline of Social Capital

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Poulsen, Anders () (Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business)
Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard () (Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In order to explain excess co-operation in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma game, we first question the standard assumption of stable and selfish preferences by introducing the concept of social capital. This analysis leads to a model that explains excess co-operation through an accumulation of social capital. We allow preferences and norms to change over time and hence endogenise them. Our results depend on individuals being able to acquire enough information to allow them to ascertain the social norm that fellow individuals subscribe to. However, our results do not depend on any assumptions about group size and no ostracism is required to generate co-operation. Our model produces three hypotheses about the emergence and stability of social capital and co-operation in society. First, neither unconditional cooperation nor universal defection is stable; second, for co-operation to be stable some individuals must be reciprocal in nature; third, we identify a 'rise and decline of social capital' which gives a cyclical pattern of co-operation in society. These findings may form the basis for future theoretical and empirical research.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.hba.dk/fsk/pdfs/0003136.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Helle Vinbaek Stenholt)
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 03-10.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 07 Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:aareco:2003_010

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Aarhus School of Business, Prismet, Silkeborgvej 2, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Phone: +45 89 486396
Fax: +45 8615 5175
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/departments/nat.aspx
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Helle Vinbaek Stenholt).

Related research
Keywords: Social capital; co-operation; selfishness; reciprocity; altruism; preference dynamic; Prisoner's Dilemma;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers iewwp040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Joel Sobel, 2002. "Can We Trust Social Capital?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(1), pages 139-154, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Paldam, Martin & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2000. "Missing social capital and the transition in Eastern Europe," Working Papers 00-5, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ahn, T K, et al, 2001. " Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(1-2), pages 137-55, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
  8. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Paldam, Martin, 2000. " Social Capital: One or Many? Definition and Measurement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(5), pages 629-53, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Witt, Ulrich, 1986. "Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(2), pages 245-66.
  11. Stigler, George J & Becker, Gary S, 1977. "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 76-90, March.
  12. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S285-300, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Fehr, Ernst & Gachter, Simon, 1998. "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 845-859, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Paldam, Martin & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2000. "An essay on social capital: looking for the fire behind the smoke," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 339-366, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Schram, Arthur, 2000. " Sorting Out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 231-58, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2002. "Why Social Preferences Matter -- The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages C1-C33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.