This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
 Ahn, T K, et al

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The impact of the cardinal relationships among pecuniary payoffs, and of social history and reputation, on the choice of strategies in four one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games is experimentally examined. The results suggest that normalized payoff values linked to "fear" and "greed" are important as predictors of behavior in the PD games. Success in coordinating on the payoff dominant equilibrium in previous plays of coordination games also increases the probability of cooperative play in the PD games. The effect of past play is strongest when individuals are matched repeatedly with the same person in previous play, as contrasted to being matched randomly with another player. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 106 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (January)
Pages: 137-55
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:106:y:2001:i:1-2:p:137-55

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Poulsen, Anders & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2003. "Rise and Decline of Social Capital," Working Papers 03-10, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Camerer, Colin & Knez, Marc, 2000. "Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination," Working Papers 1080, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kevin McCabe & Mary Rigdon & Vernon Smith, 2004. "Sustaining Cooperation in trust Games," Experimental 0403005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Chu, Ke-young, 2004. "Group-Oriented Values, Rules and Cooperation," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  5. T.K. Ahn & Myungsuk Lee & Lore Ruttan & James M. Walker, 2005. "Asymmetric Payoffs in Simultaneous and Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Caepr Working Papers 2006-003, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Springer Verlag was the first commercial publisher to be listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.