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Can We Trust Social Capital?

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  • Joel Sobel

Abstract

This essay looks at the literature on social capital from the perspective of game theory. It reviews Bowling Alone by Robert Putnam and Social Capital: A Multifaceted Approach edited by Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/0022051027001
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.

Volume (Year): 40 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 139-154

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Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:40:y:2002:i:1:p:139-154

Note: DOI: 10.1257/0022051027001
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  1. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
  2. Steven Tadelis, 1999. "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 548-563, June.
  3. Simon Johnson & John McMillan, 2002. "Courts and Relational Contracts," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 221-277, April.
  4. Juster, F. Thomas & Stafford, Frank P., 1990. "The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings, Behavioural Models, and Problems of Measurement," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 258, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  5. Philip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 162, David K. Levine.
  6. Watson, Joel, 1999. "Starting Small and Renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 52-90, March.
  7. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-51, September.
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