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An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to the strategies of community members under Joint Forest Management regime

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  • Shahi, Chander
  • Kant, Shashi
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VT4-4M57HGR-1/2/e3824c61354569d26c8feecc65ccd551
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Forest Policy and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 7 (April)
    Pages: 763-775

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:9:y:2007:i:7:p:763-775

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Rajiv Sethi, 1998. "Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Game Theory and Information 9811003, EconWPA, revised 04 Mar 1999.
    2. Lars P. Feld & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 651, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Arild Angelsen, 2001. "Playing Games in the Forest: State-Local Conflicts of Land Appropriation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299.
    4. Sethi, Rajiv, 1996. "Evolutionary stability and social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 113-140, January.
    5. Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Evolution and Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 47-66, Spring.
    6. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 1999. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Game Theory and Information 9903001, EconWPA, revised 12 Mar 1999.
    7. Ananda, Jayanath & Herath, Gamini, 2003. "Incorporating stakeholder values into regional forest planning: a value function approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 75-90, April.
    8. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
    9. Richard H. Thaler, 2000. "From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 133-141, Winter.
    10. Blume, Lawrence E., 2003. "How noise matters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 251-271, August.
    11. Klooster, Daniel, 2000. "Institutional Choice, Community, and Struggle: A Case Study of Forest Co-Management in Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-20, January.
    12. Gebremedhin, Berhanu & Pender, John & Tesfay, Girmay, 2003. "Community natural resource management: the case of woodlots in Northern Ethiopia," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(01), pages 129-148, February.
    13. Colander, David, 2000. "The Death of Neoclassical Economics," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(02), pages 127-143, June.
    14. Metcalfe, J S, 1994. "Evolutionary Economics and Technology Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(425), pages 931-44, July.
    15. McFadden, Daniel, 1999. "Rationality for Economists?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 73-105, December.
    16. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    17. Lise, Wietze, 2001. "Estimating a Game Theoretic Model," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 18(2), pages 141-57, October.
    18. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-79, May.
    19. Leskinen, Leena A., 2004. "Purposes and challenges of public participation in regional and local forestry in Finland," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(6), pages 605-618, October.
    20. Ligon, Ethan & Narain, Urvashi, 1999. "Government Management of Village Commons: Comparing Two Forest Policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 272-289, May.
    21. Samuelson,L. & Swinkels,J.M., 2001. "Evolutionary staibility and lexicographic preferences," Working papers 18, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    22. Ross Cressman & Jean-Francois Wen & William Morrison, 1998. "On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1101-1117, November.
    23. Kumar, Sanjay, 2002. "Does "Participation" in Common Pool Resource Management Help the Poor? A Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of Joint Forest Management in Jharkhand, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 763-782, May.
    24. Hill, I. & SHields, D., 1998. "Incentives for Joint Forest Management in India. Analytical Methods and Case Studies," Papers 394, World Bank - Technical Papers.
    25. Kant, Shashi, 2003. "Extending the boundaries of forest economics," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 39-56, January.
    26. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
    27. Larry Samuelson & Jeroen Swinkels, 2003. "Evolutionary Stability and Lexographic Preferences," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000456, David K. Levine.
    28. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September.
    29. Jose Apesteguia, 2001. "Does Information Matter? Some Experimental Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Game," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse24_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
    30. Kant, Shashi, 2000. "A dynamic approach to forest regimes in developing economies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 287-300, February.
    31. P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
    32. Shashi Kant & R. Albert Berry, 2001. "A Theoretical Model of Optimal Forest Resource Regimes in Developing Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(2), pages 331-355, June.
    33. L. Samuelson & J. Zhang, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 453, David K. Levine.
    34. Innes, John L., 2003. "The incorporation of research into attempts to improve forest policy in British Columbia," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 349-359, December.
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    Cited by:
    1. Limaei, Soleiman Mohammadi, 2010. "Mixed strategy game theory, application in forest industry," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(7), pages 527-531, September.
    2. Reynolds, Travis W., 2012. "Institutional Determinants of Success Among Forestry-Based Carbon Sequestration Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 542-554.

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