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Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers

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Author Info

  • Bigoni, Maria

    ()
    (University of Bologna)

  • Camera, Gabriele

    ()
    (University of Basel)

  • Casari, Marco

    ()
    (University of Bologna)

Abstract

We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 7051.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7051

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Keywords: non-standard subject pools; prisoner's dilemma; peer punishment; artefactual field experiment; stranger matching;

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  20. Gabriele Camera & Marco Casari & Maria Bigoni, 2010. "Cooperative Strategies in Groups of Strangers: An Experiment," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1237, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Camera, Gabriele & Casari, Marco & Bigoni, Maria, 2012. "Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 570-586.
  2. Vranceanu, Radu & El Ouardighi, Fouad & Dubart , Delphine, 2013. "Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School WP1310, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.

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