A Simple Approach for Organizing Behavior and Explaining Cooperation in Repeated Games
AbstractWe introduce a novel approach for organizing behavior and explaining cooperation in repeated games. Our approach is based on the idea that players differ according to an inherent propensity to cooperate that systematically affects behavior and cooperation levels. We formulate the empirical implications of this idea and test them in the lab. Our data support our approach. Our main conclusions are: (i) players' strategies in a repeated game can be ranked along a single dimension, (ii) this ranking remains stable across repeated games, and (iii) the composition of a group, in terms of its players' propensities, strongly affects cooperation levels.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by VCU School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1101.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
repeated games; cooperation; experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2011-10-15 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-10-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-10-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2011-10-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-10-15 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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