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The role of beliefs, trust, and risk in contributions to a public good

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Author Info

  • Kocher, Martin G.

    () (Department of Economics, University of Munich)

  • Martinsson, Peter

    () (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

  • Matzat, Dominik

    () (Department of Economics, University of Munich)

  • Wollbrant, Conny

    () (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

Abstract

This paper experimentally investigates the role of beliefs, trust, and risk in shaping cooperative behavior. By applying incentivized elicitation methods to measure these concepts, we find that beliefs about others’ behavior and trust are positively associated with cooperation in a public goods game. However, even though contributing unconditionally to a public good resembles a situation of making decisions under risk, elicited risk preferences do not seem to explain cooperation in a systematic way.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/24123
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 482.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 12 Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0482

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
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Related research

Keywords: Public goods; cooperation; risk preferences; trust; experiment;

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Cited by:
  1. Michalis Drouvelis & Julian C. Jamison, 2012. "Selecting public goods institutions: who likes to punish and reward?," Working Papers 12-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

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