Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems
AbstractElinor Ostrom delivered her Prize Lecture on 8 December 2009 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. She was introduced by Professor Bertil Holmlund, Chairman of the Economic Sciences Prize Committee.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Nobel Prize Committee in its series Nobel Prize in Economics documents with number 2009-4.
Length: 1 pages
Date of creation: 08 Dec 2009
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Web page: http://www.nobelprize.org
Complex; economic; systems;
Other versions of this item:
- Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 641-72, June.
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-11 (All new papers)
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