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Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers

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  • M. Bigoni
  • G. Camera
  • M. Casari

Abstract

We study individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly faced with the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategies adopted, and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers, and cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior with decentralized punishment and also personal punishment when available.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number wp828.

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Date of creation: May 2012
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Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp828

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Cited by:
  1. Radu Vranceanu & Fouad El Ouardighi & Delphine Dubart, 2013. "Coordination in Teams : A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment," Post-Print, HAL hal-00857364, HAL.
  2. Camera, Gabriele & Casari, Marco & Bigoni, Maria, 2012. "Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 570-586.

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