Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note
AbstractThe quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects' understanding of the rule.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2010-021.
Date of creation: 24 Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Quadratic scoring rule; experimental methodology; experimental design;
Other versions of this item:
- Florian Artinger & Filippos Exadaktylos & Hannes Koppel & Lauri Sääksvuori, 2010. "Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note," ThE Papers 10/01, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
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