The Devil is in the Details - Sex Differences in Simple Bargaining Games
AbstractThe study of gender differences in social preferences has shown mixed results, preventing economists and other social scientists from drawing definitive conclusions on this topic. Several original investigations and experimental reviews have hypothesized that the main reason of this heterogeneity of results is the myriad of experimental designs used to study gender differences. In this paper we test this hypothesis by making male and female participants to face two different but related experimental games and two different information treatments. Through this 2x2 factorial design, we obtain results in line with some recent papers: women are sensitive to the design and context of the experiment in ways that men are not. In addition, we go further providing a well-grounded account on the importance of the context for female decision-making.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2007-069.
Date of creation: 25 Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Beliefs; economic experiments; empathy; gender differences; social preferences.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-10-06 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-10-06 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-10-06 (Game Theory)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pablo Brañas-Garza & Juan C. Cárdenas & Máximo Rossi, 2009.
"Gender, education and reciprocal generosity: Evidence from 1,500 experiment subjects,"
Documentos de Trabajo (working papers)
1609, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Pablo Brañas-Garza & Juan C. Cárdenas & Máximo Rossi, 2009. "Gender, education and reciprocal generosity: Evidence from 1,500 experiment subjects," Working Papers 128, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
- Florian Artinger & Filippos Exadaktylos & Hannes Koppel & Lauri Sääksvuori, 2010.
"Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note,"
Jena Economic Research Papers
2010-021, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Florian Artinger & Filippos Exadaktylos & Hannes Koppel & Lauri Sääksvuori, 2010. "Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note," ThE Papers 10/01, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- David Zetland & Marina Della Giusta, 2011. "Focal Points, Gender Norms and Reciprocation in Public Good Games," Economics & Management Discussion Papers em-dp2011-01, Henley Business School, Reading University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Markus Pasche).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.