Peter Dürsch (Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Grabengasse 14, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany) Albert Kolb (Department of Economics, University of Bonn) Jörg Oechssler (Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Grabengasse 14, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany. oechssler@uni-hd.de) Burkhard C. Schipper (Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616, USA)
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We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment.
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Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number
63.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jose Apestgeguia & Steffen Huck & Jörg Oechssler, 2005.
"Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence,"
Discussion Papers
54, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Tech H., 2000.
"Strategic Learning and Teaching,"
Working Papers
1100, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005.
"Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly,"
Discussion Papers
53, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
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