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Through Trial & Error to Collusion

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Author Info
Steffen Huck (Humboldt University, Berlin)
Hans-Theo Normann (Humboldt University, Berlin)
Joerg Oechssler (Humboldt University, Berlin)

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Abstract

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that this process converges to a collusive outcome.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9811004.

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Date of creation: 19 Nov 1998
Date of revision: 24 Nov 1998
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811004

Note: Pages: 12; figure included in the second file
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: learning; game theory; oligopoly; collusion;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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  1. Carlo Altavilla & Luigi Luini & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2005. "Social Learning in Market Games," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 003, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Peter Dürsch & Albert Kolb & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers," Discussion Papers 63, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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