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Learning across games

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  • Mengel, Friederike

Abstract

This paper studies the learning process carried out by two agents who are involved in many games. As distinguishing all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents might partition the set of all games into categories. Partitions of higher cardinality are more costly. A process of simultaneous learning of actions and partitions is presented and equilibrium partitions and action choices characterized. Learning across games can destabilize strict Nash equilibria even for arbitrarily small reasoning costs and even if players distinguish all the games at the stable point. The model is also able to explain experimental findings from the travelerʼs dilemma and deviations from subgame perfection in bargaining games.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 74 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 601-619

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:2:p:601-619

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords: Learning; Bounded rationality; Categorization;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2008. "Contagion through learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(4), December.
  2. Gabor Lugosi & Omiros Papaspiliopoulos & Gilles Stoltz, 2009. "Online Multi-task Learning with Hard Constraints," Working Papers hal-00362643, HAL.
  3. Christoph March, 2011. "Adaptive social learning," PSE Working Papers halshs-00572528, HAL.
  4. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00572528 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Mohlin, Erik, 2010. "Evolution of Theories of Mind," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 0728, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 12 May 2010.
  6. Edward W. Piotrowski & Jan Sladkowski & Anna Szczypinska, 2007. "Reinforcement learning in market games," Papers 0710.0114, arXiv.org.
  7. Arina Nikandrova, 2013. "Repeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 339-346, July.
  8. Mohlin, Erik, 2014. "Optimal categorization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 356-381.
  9. Friederike Mengel & Emanuela Sciubba, 2010. "Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games," Working Papers 2010.148, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  10. K.J.M. De Jaegher & B. Hoyer, 2012. "Cooperation and the common enemy effect," Working Papers 12-24, Utrecht School of Economics.
  11. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2009. "An Experiment on Learning in a Multiple Games Environment," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  12. Heller, Yuval & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Rule Rationality," MPRA Paper 48746, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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