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Reinforcement Learning And The Power Law Of Practice: Some Analytical Results

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Ianni, A.

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Abstract

Erev and Roth (1998) among others provide a comprehensive analysis of experimental evidence on learning in games, based on a stochastic model of learning that accounts for two main elements: the Law of Effect (positive reinforcement of actions that perform well) and the Power Law of Practice (learning curves tend to be steeper initially). This note complements this literature by providing an analytical study of the properties of such learning models. Specifically, the paper shows that: (a) up to an error term, the stochastic process is driven by a system of discrete time difference equations of the replicator type. This carries an analogy with Börgers and Sarin (1997), where reinforcement learning accounts only for the Law of Effect. (b) if the trajectories of the system of replicator equations converge sufficiently fast, then the probability that all realizations of the learning process over a possibly infinite spell of time lie within a given small distance of the solution path of the replicator dynamics becomes, from some time on, arbitrarily close to one. Fast convergence, in the form of exponential convergence, is shown to hold for any strict Nash equilibrium of the underlying game.

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Paper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 0203.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2002
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Handle: RePEc:stn:sotoec:0203

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  1. Peter Dürsch & Albert Kolb & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers," Discussion Papers 63, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Antonella Ianni, 2007. "Learning Strict Nash Equilibria through Reinforcement," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/21, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ed Hopkins & Martin Posch, 2003. "Attainability of Boundary Points under Reinforcement Learning," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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