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Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study

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Author Info
Roth, Alvin E
Schoumaker, Francoise

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 73 (1983)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 362-72
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:73:y:1983:i:3:p:362-72

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  10. Gary Charness & Margarida Corominas, 2000. "Bargaining on Networks: An Experiment," Economics Working Papers 492, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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