Do We Detect and Exploit Mixed Strategy Play by Opponents?

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Do We Detect and Exploit Mixed Strategy Play by Opponents?

Author Info

Jason Shachat (National University of Singapore)
J. Todd Swarthout (University of Arizona)

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Abstract

We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number 0310001.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 04 Oct 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0310001

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-10-12 (All new papers)
NEP-EXP-2003-10-12 (Experimental Economics)

Cited by:
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Spiliopoulos, Leonidas, 2009. "Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in repeated mixed strategy games," MPRA Paper 6666, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Spiliopoulos, Leonidas, 2008. "Humans versus computer algorithms in repeated mixed strategy games," MPRA Paper 6672, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

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