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Learning in experimental 2×2 games

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  • Chmura, Thorsten
  • Goerg, Sebastian J.
  • Selten, Reinhard

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce two new learning models: action-sampling learning and impulse-matching learning. These two models, together with the models of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning, are applied to 12 different 2×2 games and their results are compared with the results from experimental data. We test whether the models are capable of replicating the aggregate distribution of behavior, as well as correctly predicting individualsʼ round-by-round behavior. Our results are two-fold: while the simulations with impulse-matching and action-sampling learning successfully replicate the experimental data on the aggregate level, individual behavior is best described by self-tuning EWA. Nevertheless, impulse-matching learning has the second-highest score for the individual data. In addition, only self-tuning EWA and impulse-matching learning lead to better round-by-round predictions than the aggregate frequencies, which means they adjust their predictions correctly over time.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 76 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 44-73

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:1:p:44-73

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords: 2×2 games; Experimental data; Learning; Impulse-matching; Self-tuning EWA; Reinforcement; Action-sampling;

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Cited by:
  1. Ding, Jieyao & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2013. "On the impulse in impulse learning," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 294-297.
  2. Christos A. Ioannou & Julian Romero, 2012. "Strategic Learning With Finite Automata Via The EWA-Lite Model," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1269, Purdue University, Department of Economics.

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