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Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Randall S. Kroszner
Thomas Stratmann
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Paper provided by Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State in its series University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State with number
155.
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Handle: RePEc:fth:chices:155Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, CENTER FOR STUDY OF THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE, 1101 E. 58TH STREET CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60637. Web page: http://www.stiglercenter.org/ More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998.
"Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998.
"Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees ,"
CRSP working papers
349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1996.
"Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress:Theory And Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees ,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
126, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
[Downloadable!] Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, .
"Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services', Political Action Committees ,"
CRSP working papers
465, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999.
"What Drives Deregulation? Economics And Politics Of The Relaxation Of Bank Branching Restrictions ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1437-1467, November.
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Ghosh, Parikshit & Ray, Debraj, 1996.
"Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows ,"
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Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(3), pages 491-519, July.
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Other versions: Alesina, Alberto & Cukierman, Alex, 1990.
"The Politics of Ambiguity ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 829-50, November.
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Other versions: Tirole, Jean, 1994.
"The Internal Organization of Government ,"
Oxford Economic Papers ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
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Other versions: Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995.
"Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 769-98, August.
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Other versions: Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988.
"The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-63, February.
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Randall S. Kroszner, 1999.
"Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation ,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
151, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
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Koenker, Roger W & Bassett, Gilbert, Jr, 1978.
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Econometrica ,
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Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981.
"The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
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Snyder, James M, Jr, 1992.
"Long-Term Investing in Politicians; or, Give Early, Give Often ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 15-43, April.
Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991.
"Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions ,"
Economic Inquiry ,
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Daniel, Kermit & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997.
" Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from California's State Legislative Races ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 165-84, March.
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Randall S. Kroszner, 1999.
"Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation ,"
CRSP working papers
492, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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White, Halbert, 1980.
"A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
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Zeckhauser, Richard, 1969.
"Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 83(4), pages 696-703, November.
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Poole, Keith T & Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1987.
"The Revealed Preferences of Political Action Committees ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 298-302, May.
Stratmann, Thomas, 1998.
"The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything? ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
Evans, William N & Kessides, Ioannis N, 1993.
"Localized Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry ,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics ,
MIT Press, vol. 75(1), pages 66-75, February.
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Stratmann, Thomas, 1995.
"Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter? ,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics ,
MIT Press, vol. 77(1), pages 127-36, February.
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Dalton Conley & Brian J. McCabe, 2008.
"Bribery or Just Desserts? Evidence on the Influence of Congressional Voting Patterns on PAC Contributions from Exogenous Variation in the Sex Mix of Legislator Offspring ,"
NBER Working Papers
13945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000.
"Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms ,"
CRSP working papers
512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
[Downloadable!]
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