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Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties

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  • Martinelli, Cesar
  • Matsui, Akihiko

Abstract

We develop a spatial model of competition between two policy-motivated parties. The parties know which policies are desirable for voters, while voters do not. The announced positions of the parties serve as signals to the voters concerning the parties' private information. In all separating equilibria, when the left-wing party attains power, the policies it implements are to the right of the policies implemented by the right-wing party when it attains power. Intuitively, when right-wing policies become more attractive, the left party moves toward the right in order to be assured of winning, while the right-wing party stays put in a radical stance. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 39-61

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:1:p:39-61

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  1. Cukierman, A., 1997. "When Does it Take A Nixon To Go To China?," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1997-91, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Robert Gibbons, 1988. "Learning In Equilibrium Models of Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 2547, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
  4. Myerson, Roger B., 1998. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 111-131, October.
  5. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1991. "Oligopoly Limit Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 155-172, Summer.
  6. Roemer, J.E., 1992. "The Emergence of Party Ideology when Voter Are Uncertain about How the Economy Works," Papers, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs 396, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
  7. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
  8. : Christian Schultz, . "Polarization and Inefficient Policies," Discussion Papers 93-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  9. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. "A model of electoral competition with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 309-325, April.
  10. Rodrik, Dani, 1993. "The Positive Economics of Policy Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 356-61, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Tilman Klumpp, 2011. "Populism, Partisanship, and the Funding of Political Campaigns," Emory Economics, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) 1107, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  2. Müller, W. & Spiegel, Y. & Yehezkel, Y., 2009. "Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125107, Tilburg University.
  3. Kunal Sengupta & Amal Sanyal, 2004. "Delegation in a Cheap-Talk Game: A Voting Example," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings, Econometric Society 471, Econometric Society.
  4. Amal Sanyal & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Reputation, Cheap Talk and Delegation," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0501001, EconWPA.
  5. Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-29, January.

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