AbstractIn their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but just try to outguess popular opinion. Although rational voters see through such populism, candidates can not resist resorting to it when the spoils of office are too large. For an intermediate parameter range, both populism and its opposite, “candor”, can be sustained as equilibria. This means that the public’s trust or distrust in politicians may be self-fulfilling prophecies. Importantly, the more informed politicians are about public opinion, the more likely it is that populist behavior can be avoided.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden) in its series Working Paper Series with number 166.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2004
Date of revision:
popular opinion; electoral competition; candidate motivation; pandering; political trust;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-06-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAM-2004-06-27 (Central & South America)
- NEP-POL-2004-06-27 (Positive Political Economics)
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