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Citations for "Hiding information in electoral competition"

by Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan

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1. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 86-112, October.
   
   • Santiago Sanchez-Pages & Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game," ESE Discussion Papers 128, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
2. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 124, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
   
   • Schipper, Burkhard C. & Woo, Hee Yeul, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 2012-04, University of California at Davis, Department of Economics.
3. Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher, 2008. "Learning, public good provision, and the information trap," IEW - Working Papers 371, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
   
   • Berentsen, Aleksander & Bruegger, Esther & Loertscher, Simon, 2008. "Learning, public good provision, and the information trap," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 998-1010, June.
4. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2002. "The Dark Side of Competitive Pressure," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 02/3, Hunter College: Department of Economics, revised 2002.
   
   • Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2005. "The Dark Side of Competitive Pressure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 361-397, Summer.
   • Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2002. "The dark side of competitive pressure," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
5. Gabriele Gratton, 2011. "Pandering, Faith and Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers 2012-22, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
6. Kikuchi, Kazuya, 2011. "Privately informed parties and policy divergence," Discussion Papers 2011-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
7. Kazuya Kikuchi, 2011. "Privately informed parties and policy divergence," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd10-160, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
8. Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Private polling in elections and voter welfare," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2021-2056, September.
9. Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Are We Better Off If Our Politicians Have More Information?," Public Economics 0209001, EconWPA.
   
   • Johan Lagerl–f, 2004. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(1), pages 123-142, 03.
   • Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
10. Frisell, Lars, 2004. "Populism," Working Paper Series 166, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
11. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Media Bias and Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 280-316, April.
    
    • Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse Shapiro, 2005. "Media Bias and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 11664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
12. John Duggan, 2003. "Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000029, UCLA Department of Economics.
    
    • Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-29, January.
13. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sorensen, 2002. "Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 02-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
14. Kittsteiner, Thomas & Eyster, Erik, 2007. "Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 41-70, March.
15. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis," DFAEII Working Papers 2012-14, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
16. Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Hiding information in electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January.
    
    • Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002.
17. Kikuchi, Kazuya, 2011. "Privately informed parties and policy divergence," CCES Discussion Paper Series 40, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
18. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2007. "“Yes-Men in Tournaments," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 417, Hunter College: Department of Economics.
19. Lydia Mechtenberg, 2007. "Ideology Without Ideologists," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2007-021, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
20. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2005. "Information Management in Rank-Order Tournaments," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 413, Hunter College: Department of Economics.

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