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Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates

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John Duggan

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/iobara/seminarW03/feb03part1.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Theory workshop papers with number 505798000000000029.

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Date of creation: 06 Mar 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000029

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  1. Alejandro Saporiti, 2007. "Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case," Wallis Working Papers WP50, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2006. "Partisan Politics and Aggregation Failure with Ignorant Voters," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000828, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alejandro Saporiti, 2005. "On the existence of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition," Game Theory and Information 0504005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2004. "Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000083, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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