Existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case

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Existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case

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Alejandro Saporiti

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Paper provided by Economics, The University of Manchester in its series The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series with number 0702.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:man:sespap:0702

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-02-09 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2008-02-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-GTH-2008-02-09 (Game Theory)
NEP-MIC-2008-02-09 (Microeconomics)

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Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
Enriqueta Aragonés & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Economics Working Papers 502, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas. R., 2000. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate," Working Papers 1102, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Steffen Hoernig, 2007. "Bertrand Games and Sharing Rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 573-585, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-29, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- John Duggan, 2003. "Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000029, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Ignacio Ortuño Orti´n, 2002. "Ideological versus Downsian political competition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 551-567. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hinich, Melvin J., 1977. "Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 208-219, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hinich, M., 1976. "Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: The Median Voter Result is an Artifact," Working Papers 119, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Duggan, John & Fey, Mark, 2005. "Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 490-522, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- John Duggan & Mark Fey, . "Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates," Wallis Working Papers WP19, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
John E. Roemer, 1997. "Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 479-502. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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