Ideological versus Downsian political competition

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Ideological versus Downsian political competition

Author Info

Ignacio Ortuño Orti´n () (Department of Economics and I.V.I.E., University of Alicante, Ap. Correos 99, 03080-Alicante, Spain)

Abstract

We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters' types. We assume that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians; members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on the contrary, care only about winning the election. We consider two possibilities: that members choose the political platforms and that professional politicians are the ones who choose such platforms. The expected utility for party members is analyzed under these two cases. We find that when professional politicians have no informational advantage, it is on the interest of both parties to let professional politicians choose the platforms. Only in the case in which professional politicians have much better information than the members of the party about voters is it possible that party members obtain a greater expected utility choosing the platforms themselves rather than letting the professional politicians choose.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 551-567
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:551-567

Note: Received: 31 May 1999/Accepted: 1 March 2001
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Alejandro Saporiti, 2007. "Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case," Wallis Working Papers WP50, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
Germa Bel & Antonio Miralles, 2004. "Machiavellian Taxation? The political economy of public service financing," Public Economics 0409013, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Alejandro Saporiti, 2007. "Existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0702, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]

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