Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
AbstractIn this paper is remarked that "mixed" strategies in games of electoral competition do not need to be interpreted as random moves. There are two a priori symmetric parties, and a finite (non spatial) set of alternatives. Parties are allowed to take unclear positions, by campaining on a "platform" that is a mix of several alternatives. Each individual nevertheless identifies a party with a single alternative, the number of individuals who identify a party with a given alternative being proportional to the importance of that alternative in the party's platform.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: 24 March 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- LASLIER, Jean-François & PICARD, Nathalie, 2000. "Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bierbrauer, F.J. & Boyer, F.J., 2011.
"Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
1108, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Bierbrauer, Felix J. & Boyer, Pierre C., 2013. "Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-14.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Pierre C. Boyer, 2010. "Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_45, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Felix J. Bierbrauer & Pierre C. Boyer, 2010. "Political Competition and Mirrleesian Income Taxation: A First Pass," CESifo Working Paper Series 3294, CESifo Group Munich.
- Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
- Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2000.
"The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects,"
416, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2491-2505, October.
- DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, . "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- De Donner, P. & Hindriks, J., 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Papers 00-542, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-Francois Laslier, 2013. "Preference Intensity Representation : Strategic Overstating in Large Elections," Post-Print hal-00917099, HAL.
- Alejandro Saporiti, 2005. "On the existence of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition," Game Theory and Information 0504005, EconWPA.
- Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol & Ok, Efe A., 2007. "Voting over income taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 249-286, May.
- Jesper Roine, 2006. "Downsian Competition When No Policy is Unbeatable," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 273-284, August.
- Jean-François Laslier, 2003.
"Ambiguity in electoral competition,"
- Caroline D. Thomas, 2010. "Strategic Experimentation with Congestion," Department of Economics Working Papers 130813, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2013.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Efe Ok, 2004. "Multidimensional income taxation and electoral competition: an equilibrium analysis," Departmental Working Papers 200407, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Bryan McCannon, 2009. "Can the majority lose the election?," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 305-317, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.