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Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies

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  • Jean-FranÚois Laslier

    ()
    (THEMA, CNRS, UniversitÊ de Cergy-Pontoise, 33, boulevard du Port, F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France)

Abstract

In this paper is remarked that "mixed" strategies in games of electoral competition do not need to be interpreted as random moves. There are two a priori symmetric parties, and a finite (non spatial) set of alternatives. Parties are allowed to take unclear positions, by campaining on a "platform" that is a mix of several alternatives. Each individual nevertheless identifies a party with a single alternative, the number of individuals who identify a party with a given alternative being proportional to the importance of that alternative in the party's platform.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 283-292

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:2:p:283-292

Note: Received: 24 March 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999
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Cited by:
  1. Matias Nunez & Jean-Francois Laslier, 2013. "Preference Intensity Representation : Strategic Overstating in Large Elections," Post-Print hal-00917099, HAL.
  2. Felix Bierbrauer & Pierre C. Boyer, 2010. "Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_45, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  3. Caroline D. Thomas, 2010. "Strategic Experimentation with Congestion," Department of Economics Working Papers 130813, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2013.
  4. De Donner, P. & Hindriks, J., 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Papers 00-542, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  5. Jean-François Laslier, 2003. "Ambiguity in electoral competition," Working Papers hal-00242944, HAL.
  6. DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, . "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Alejandro Saporiti, 2005. "On the existence of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition," Game Theory and Information 0504005, EconWPA.
  8. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
  9. Bryan McCannon, 2009. "Can the majority lose the election?," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 305-317, December.
  10. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Efe Ok, 2004. "Multidimensional income taxation and electoral competition: an equilibrium analysis," Departmental Working Papers 200407, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  11. Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol & Ok, Efe A., 2007. "Voting over income taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 249-286, May.
  12. LASLIER, Jean-François & PICARD, Nathalie, 2000. "Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Jesper Roine, 2006. "Downsian Competition When No Policy is Unbeatable," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 273-284, August.

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