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Electoral Competition Between Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information

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Author Info

  • Enriqueta Aragonès
  • Thomas R. Palfrey

Abstract

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 60.

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Date of creation: Feb 2004
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:60

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References

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  1. Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 59, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas. R., 2000. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1102, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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Cited by:
  1. Alejandro Saporiti, 2008. "Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Electoral Competition Games: The Hybrid Case," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 827-857, October.
  2. Michalis Drouvelis & Alejandro Saporiti & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2011. "Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Economics, The University of Manchester 1119, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  3. Enriqueta Aragonés & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2011. "Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space," Working Papers 529, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Alejandro Saporiti, 2005. "On the existence of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0504005, EconWPA.

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