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On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence

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  • Hummel, Patrick
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    Abstract

    I analyze mixed strategy equilibria in a Downsian model with two office-motivated candidates in which one candidate is endowed with a sufficiently large valence advantage that a voter might prefer this candidate even if the voter strictly prefers the other candidate's policies. There is a discrete one-dimensional policy space and the preferences of the median voter are uncertain. I show that there is a range of moderate policies with no gaps that are optimal for the advantaged candidate. There is also a range of liberal policies with no gaps and a corresponding range of conservative policies with no gaps that are optimal actions for the disadvantaged candidate. The upper and lower bounds on these ranges of policies vary in predictable ways with the size of the advantaged candidate's advantage.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4YC1K5G-2/2/6eadaa18f4a049d23fb12a7946d422d2
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 70 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 2 (November)
    Pages: 425-445

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:425-445

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

    Related research

    Keywords: Candidate valence Downsian model Mixed equilibrium Policy selection;

    References

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    1. Duggan, John, 2007. "Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 52-74, July.
    2. Prat, A., 1997. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," Discussion Paper 1997-118, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 911-22, July.
    4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
    5. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. " Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-36, June.
    6. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas. R., 2000. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate," Working Papers 1102, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    7. Ashworth, Scott & Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 2009. "Elections with platform and valence competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 191-216, September.
    8. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 88-105, March.
    9. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Dix, Manfred & Santore, Rudy, 2002. "Candidate ability and platform choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 189-194, July.
    11. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
    12. Prat, A., 1998. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies," Discussion Paper 1998-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    13. Bester, Helmut & de Palma, Andre & Leininger, Wolfgang & Thomas, Jonathan & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1996. "A Noncooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 165-186, February.
    14. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 223-37, February.
    15. Adams, James, 1999. " Policy Divergence in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(1-2), pages 103-22, July.
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    Cited by:
    1. Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2012. "Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-480.
    2. Marcin Dziubiński & Jaideep Roy, 2011. "Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 1-24, January.
    3. Michalis Drouvelis & Alejandro Saporiti & Nicolaas J Vriend, 2011. "Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 11-15, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.

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