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Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates

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Author Info
Bernhardt, Dan
Duggan, John
Squintani, Francesco

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4JRVB8V-4/2/0ad2e8f986ee155253b4863ae1264c13
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 58 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-29
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:1:p:1-29

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Alejandro Saporiti, 2007. "Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case," Wallis Working Papers WP50, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2006. "Partisan Politics and Aggregation Failure with Ignorant Voters," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000828, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alejandro Saporiti, 2007. "Existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0702, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alejandro Saporiti, 2005. "On the existence of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition," Game Theory and Information 0504005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2004. "Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000083, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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