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Downsian Model with Asymmetric Information: Possibility of Policy Divergence

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  • Kazuya Kikuchi

Abstract

This paper presents a model of Downsian political competition in which voters are imperfectly informed about economic fundamentals. In this setting, parties fchoices of platforms influence voters f behavior not only through voters f preferences over policies, but also through formation of their expectation on the unknown fundamentals. We show that there exist pure-strategy equilibria in this political game with asymmetric information at which the two parties f policies diverge with positive probability. This result is in contrast with the well-known median voter theorem in the classical model of Downsian competition. We also study refinement of equilibria, and identify the perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) and the strictly perfect equilibria (Okada, 1981). The Nash equilibria with the strongest asymmetry in the parties f strategies are proved to be strictly perfect.

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  • Kazuya Kikuchi, 2009. "Downsian Model with Asymmetric Information: Possibility of Policy Divergence," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd08-029, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hst:ghsdps:gd08-029
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-29, January.
    2. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. "A model of electoral competition with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 309-325, April.
    3. Navin Kartik & R. Preston McAfee, 2007. "Signaling Character in Electoral Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 852-870, June.
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