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An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Sanchez-Pages, Santiago
Vorsatz, Marc
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior .
Volume (Year): 61 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 86-112
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:61:y:2007:i:1:p:86-112Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Blume, Andreas, et al, 1998.
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Antoni Bosch-Domènech & José G. Montalvo & Rosemarie Nagel & Albert Satorra, 2002.
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Florian Ederer & Ernst Fehr, 2007.
"Deception and Incentives: How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
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Other versions: Santiago Sánchez-Pagés & Marc Vorsatz, 2009.
"Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling ,"
Experimental Economics ,
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Other versions: Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, .
"Trust, Communication and Contracts: An Experiment ,"
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Serra Garcia, M. & Damme, E.E.C. van & Potters, J.J.M., 2008.
"Truth or Efficiency? Communication in a Sequential Public Good Game ,"
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2008-107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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"The Power of Words: Why Communication fosters Cooperation and Efficiency ,"
Working Papers in Economic Theory
2009/01, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
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Sjaak Hurkens & Navin Kartik, 2009.
"Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion ,"
Experimental Economics ,
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