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Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game

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Author Info

  • Peeters, Ronald
  • Vorsatz, Marc
  • Walzl, Markus

    (METEOR)

Abstract

We show in a sender-receiver game with strictly opposing interests that rewards enhance trust but do not influence truth-telling. Subjects who reward tend to tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of reward opportunities. The amount of obtained rewards thereby enhances truth-telling.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 019.

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Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2007019

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Keywords: microeconomics ;

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References

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  1. James Andreoni & William T. harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, 2002. "The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers, University of Oregon Economics Department 2002-01, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 20 Aug 2002.
  2. Crawford, Vincent P., 2001. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego qt6k65014s, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  3. Offerman, Theo, 2002. "Hurting hurts more than helping helps," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1423-1437, September.
  4. Santiago Sanchez-Pages & Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game," ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 128, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  5. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  6. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
  7. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2003. "Truth or Consequences: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 49(1), pages 116-130, January.
  8. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2006. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Caepr Working Papers, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington 2006-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006.
  9. Cai, Hongbin & Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi, 2006. "Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 7-36, July.
  10. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  11. David Dickinson, . "The carrot vs. the stick in work team motivation," Working Papers, Utah State University, Department of Economics 2000-06, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
  12. Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc & Walzl, Markus, 2007. "Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 019, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2013. "Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages," MPRA Paper 45727, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Vera Angelova & Tobias Regner, 2012. "Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2012-011, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  3. Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc & Walzl, Markus, 2008. "Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 148-150, November.
  4. Mehmet Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2014. "Truth-telling and trust in sender–receiver games with intervention: an experimental study," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 83-103, June.
  5. Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias, 2013. "Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 205-218.
  6. Ismail Saglam & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan, 2011. "Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum 1123, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  7. Katharina Eckartz & Christiane Ehses-Friedrich, 2014. "Strategic Communication: An Experimental Investigation," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2014-007, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.

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