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Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Cai, Hongbin
Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior .
Volume (Year): 56 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 7-36
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:56:y:2006:i:1:p:7-36Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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