Blume, Andreas () (University of Iowa) DeJong, Douglas V. () (University of Iowa) Kim, Yong-Gwan (Seoul City University) Sprinkle, Geoffrey B. (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Abstract
This paper uses experiments to investigate the evolution of communication. We consider simple games of information transmission in which the interests of senders and receivers are imperfectly aligned. We show that under four canonical incentive conditions the no-communication hypothesis can be rejected with and without literal meanings. Communicative outcomes are less likely to evolve and, if they do, evolve more slowly without a commonly understood language. When we see communicative outcomes, they tend to satisfy a partial common interest condition. Equilibria are useful guideposts for analyzing outcomes but are not always obtained; e.g., with literal meanings we observe stable sucker behavior and adherence to focal meanings and, without literal meanings, combinations of actions that could not coexist under
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
97-18.
Length: 35 Pages Date of creation: Nov 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:97-18
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242 Phone: (319) 335-0829 Fax: (319) 335-1956 Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/ More information through EDIRC
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