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On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as Coordination Devices

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  • Paola Manzini
  • Abdolkarim Sadrieh
  • Nicolaas J. Vriend

Abstract

In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognised and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium. Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 119 (2009)
Issue (Month): 537 (04)
Pages: 826-854

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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:537:p:826-854

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. John Bone & Michalis Drouvelis & Indrajit Ray, 2012. "Following Recommendations to Avoid Coordination-Failure in 2 x 2 Games," Discussion Papers 12-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  2. Centorrino, Samuele & Djemaï, Elodie & Hopfensitz, Astrid & Milinski, Manfred & Seabright, Paul, 2011. "Smiling is a Costly Signal of Cooperation Opportunities: Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game," TSE Working Papers 11-231, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  3. Peter H. Kriss & Andreas Blume & Roberto A. Weber, 2011. "Coordination, efficiency and pre-play communication with forgone costly messages," ECON - Working Papers 034, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  4. Johne Bone & Michalis Drouvelis & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria," Discussion Papers 12-04r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  5. Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2010. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1892-1912, September.
  6. Quazi Shahriar & Subhasish Dugar, 2009. "Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: Role of Relative Label Salience," Working Papers 0033, San Diego State University, Department of Economics.
  7. Flesch János & Perea Andrés, 2009. "Strategic Disclosure of Random Variables," Research Memoranda 024, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.

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