When Are Nash Equilibria Self Enforcing ? An Experimental Analysis
AbstractWe investigate the effect of non-binding pre-play communication in experiments with simple two-player coordination games. We reproduce the results of other studies in which play converges to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium in the absence of communication, and communication moves outcomes in the direction of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97-04.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
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Other versions of this item:
- Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001. "When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 495-515.
- Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 1997. "When Are Nash Equilibria Self-Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis," Experimental 9707001, EconWPA.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Jose Luis Ferreira, 1990. "A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept," Discussion Papers 896, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ferreira, José Luis, . "A Communication Proof Equilibrium Concept," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/5132, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
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- Straub, Paul G., 1995. "Risk dominance and coordination failures in static games," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 339-363.
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