Strengths of the Weakest-Link
AbstractThe "Weakest Link" is a game show full of paradox. To increase the probability of winning, contestants should eliminate the strongest players. Yet, if it is anticipated that the best player is to be eliminated, participants do not answer questions correctly and nothing is gained. We solve a game that illustrates the Weakest Link tradeoffs and show that two equilibria coexist: an equilibrium in which players remain silent and a more entertaining equilibrium in which they give good answers whenever they can. We study the first wave of the Weakest Link show broadcast in France. Contestants vote against the weakest player and answer truthfully to the questions. They exhibit, however, myopic behavior as they do not use all the available information. The selection of one equilibrium or the other relies on how players coordinate in voting subgames. Three arguments are provided to explain observed behavior: Pareto domination, risk domination, and the "mise en scène" of the show.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number 0210002.
Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 27 Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on pc; pages: 45; figures: 3
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://22.214.171.124
Coordination; Pareto and risk domination; vote; game show; eld experiment;
Other versions of this item:
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-11-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2002-11-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2002-11-04 (Game Theory)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard, 2005. "Empirical Evidence on the Preferences of Racetrack Bettors," IDEI Working Papers 178, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.