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To Spin or Not to Spin? Natural and Laboratory Experiments from "The Price is Right"

Author

Listed:
  • Rafael Tenorio

    (De Paul University)

  • Timothy N. Cason

    (Purdue University)

Abstract

"The Wheel" is a sequential game of perfect information played twice during each taping of the television game show "The Price is Right". This game has simple rules and the stakes are high. We derive the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (USPNE) for "The Wheel" and test its predictive ability using data from both the television show and laboratory plays of this game. We find that contestants frequently deviate from the USPNE when the decisions are difficult. The pattern of these deviations is (a) largely independent of the stakes of the game, and (b) consistent with a psychological bias of the omission-commission type. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2002

Suggested Citation

  • Rafael Tenorio & Timothy N. Cason, 2002. "To Spin or Not to Spin? Natural and Laboratory Experiments from "The Price is Right"," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 170-195, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:112:y:2002:i:476:p:170-195
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas de Roos & Yianis Sarafidis, 2010. "Decision making under risk in Deal or No Deal," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(6), pages 987-1027.
    2. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
    3. Ahmad Barirani & Randolph Sloof & Mirjam van Praag, 2017. "The Origins and Extent of Entrepreneurial Action-Orientedness: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-006/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Fiore, Annamaria, 2009. "Experimental Economics: Some Methodological Notes," MPRA Paper 12498, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Carlin, Bruce I. & Robinson, David T., 2009. "Fear and loathing in Las Vegas: Evidence from blackjack tables," Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(5), pages 385-396, August.
    6. Kate Antonovics & Peter Arcidiacono & Randall Walsh, 2005. "Games and Discrimination: Lessons From The Weakest Link," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 40(4), pages 918-947.
    7. Gee, C., 2007. "Risky Choice and Type-Uncertainty in "Deal or No Deal?"," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0758, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Uyanga Turmunkh & Martijn J. van den Assem & Dennie van Dolder, 2019. "Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4795-4812, October.
    9. Buser, Thomas & van den Assem, Martijn J. & van Dolder, Dennie, 2023. "Gender and willingness to compete for high stakes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 206(C), pages 350-370.
    10. Philippe Février & Laurent Linnemer, 2002. "Strengths of the "Weakest Link"?," Working Papers 2002-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    11. Fevrier, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2006. "Equilibrium selection: Payoff or risk dominance?: The case of the "weakest link"," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 164-181, June.
    12. Gabriella Sjögren Lindquist & Jenny Säve-Söderbergh, 2012. "Securing victory or not? Surrendering optimal play when facing simple calculations -- a natural experiment from the Swedish and US Jeopardy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(6), pages 777-783, February.
    13. Sjögren Lindquist, Gabriella & Säve-Söderbergh, Jenny, 2006. "Testing the rationality assumption using a design difference in the TV game show 'Jeopardy'," Working Paper Series 9/2006, Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
    14. Luís Pacheco & Júlio Lobão & Sílvia Coelho, 2023. "Gender and Risk Aversion: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-16, June.
    15. Paul Healy & John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & Harley Thronson & Peter Ulrich & Giulio Varsi, 2007. "Contracting inside an organization: An experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 143-167, June.
    16. Bruce I. Carlin & David T. Robinson, 2009. "Fear and loathing in Las Vegas: Evidence from blackjack tables," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 4(5), pages 385-396, August.
    17. repec:cup:judgdm:v:4:y:2009:i:5:p:385-396 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Martijn J. van den Assem & Dennie van Dolder & Richard H. Thaler, 2012. "Split or Steal? Cooperative Behavior When the Stakes Are Large," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 2-20, January.
    19. John A. List, 2004. "Young, Selfish and Male: Field evidence of social preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 121-149, January.
    20. Daniel K. N. Johnson & Tracy R. Gleason, 2009. "Who REALLY Wants to be a Millionaire? Gender Differences in Game Show Contestant Behavior Under Risk," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 90(2), pages 243-261, June.
    21. Pogrebna, Ganna, 2008. "Naive advice when half a million is at stake," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 148-154, February.
    22. Gonzalez, Luis J. & Castaneda, Marco & Scott, Frank, 2019. "Solving the simultaneous truel in The Weakest Link: Nash or revenge?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 56-72.

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