This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Harsanyi John C.
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
No abstract is available for
this item.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior .
Volume (Year): 10 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 318-332
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:2:p:318-332Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 1997.
"When Are Nash Equilibria Self-Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis ,"
Experimental
9707001, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Clark, K. & Kay, S. & Sefton, M, 1997.
"When Are Nash Equilibria Self Enforcing ? An Experimental Analysis ,"
Working Papers
97-04, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001.
"When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 495-515.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller & Andreas Stiehler, 2006.
"From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence ,"
Experimental Economics ,
Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 17-33, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Muller, W. & Fischer, S. & Guth, W. & Stiehler, A., 2003.
"From ultimatum to nash bargaining: theory and experimental evidence ,"
Discussion Paper
41, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller, .
"From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and Experimental Evidence ,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2003-07, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
[Downloadable!] Blonski, Matthias & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2003.
"Prisoners' Other Dilemma ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3856, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Antonio Cabrales & Walter Garcia Fontes & Massimo Motta, 1997.
"Risk Dominance Selects the Leader. An Experimental Analysis ,"
Economics Working Papers
222, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Walter Elberfeld, 1997.
"Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in 2×2 matrix games ,"
Journal of Economics ,
Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 279-290, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Damme, E. van, 1995.
"Equilibrium selection in team games ,"
Discussion Paper
125, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Gary Charness & Brit Grosskopf, 2001.
"Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination -Experimental Evidence ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
wp9-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Gary Charness & Brit Grosskopf, .
"Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination- Experimental Evidence ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
9-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
[Downloadable!] Gary Charness & Brit Grosskopf, 2001.
"Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination -Experimental Evidence ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
09-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
[Downloadable!] Werner Güth, 2002.
"On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement ,"
Theory and Decision ,
Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen Van, 2008.
"Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games ,"
Working Papers
08-19, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2008.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, .
"An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination ,"
Virginia Economics Online Papers
326, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: repec:att:wimass:1919982 is not listed on IDEAS
Gunnthorsdottir, Anna & Vragov, Roumen & seifert, Stefan & McCabe, Kevin, 2008.
"on the efficiency of team-based meritocracies ,"
MPRA Paper
8627, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? All the bibliographic data shown here has been contributed by volunteers, thereby helping to keep this service free.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .