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A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information

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Harsanyi John C.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 10 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 318-332
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:2:p:318-332

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  1. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 1997. "When Are Nash Equilibria Self-Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis," Experimental 9707001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller & Andreas Stiehler, 2006. "From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 17-33, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Blonski, Matthias & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2003. "Prisoners' Other Dilemma," CEPR Discussion Papers 3856, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Antonio Cabrales & Walter Garcia Fontes & Massimo Motta, 1997. "Risk Dominance Selects the Leader. An Experimental Analysis," Economics Working Papers 222, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Walter Elberfeld, 1997. "Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in 2×2 matrix games," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 279-290, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Damme, E. van, 1995. "Equilibrium selection in team games," Discussion Paper 125, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Gary Charness & Brit Grosskopf, 2001. "Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination -Experimental Evidence," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp9-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen Van, 2008. "Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games," Working Papers 08-19, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, . "An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination," Virginia Economics Online Papers 326, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  11. repec:att:wimass:1919982 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Gunnthorsdottir, Anna & Vragov, Roumen & seifert, Stefan & McCabe, Kevin, 2008. "on the efficiency of team-based meritocracies," MPRA Paper 8627, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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