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On Rationalizability in Two-Person Alternating-Offer Bargaining

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Author Info
Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES); UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

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Abstract

This paper reconsiders Rubinstein's alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information. We define rationalizability for multi-stage games with observed actions. Whe show that rationalizability does not exclude perpetual disagreement or delay. Then, we define trembling-hand rationalizability and we show that it implies a unique solution. Moreover, this unique solution is the subgame perfect equilibrium. We also reconsider an extension of Rubinstein's game wherein there is a smallest money unit.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 1996023.

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Length: 16
Date of creation: 01 Oct 1996
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1996023

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Related research
Keywords: bargaining; alternating-offer; rationalizability; money unit;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996. "Admissibility and common knowledge," Discussion Paper 16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 188-201, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1991. "A Note on Bargaining over a Finite Number of Feasible Agreements," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 290-92, July.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. VANNETELBOSCHÊ, VincentÊV., 1995. "Two-Person Sequential Bargaining with Boundedly Rational Players," CORE Discussion Papers 1995053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Cho, In-Koo, 1994. "Stationarity, Rationalizability and Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(2), pages 357-74, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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