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Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?

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Author Info
Bohnet, Iris (Harvard U)
Cooter, Robert (U of California, Berkeley)
Abstract

Besides deterring people, laws may affect behavior by changing preferences or beliefs. A law may elicit intrinsic motivation by framing an act as wrong. Alternatively, it may coordinate the behavior of different people by changing their beliefs about what others will do. We investigate framing and coordination effects experimentally in prisoner's dilemma, "crowding" and coordination games. We simulate a law by imposing a probabilistic penalty on one of the choices. In the prisoner's dilemma and the crowding game, announcing the penalty had no effect. In the coordination game, announcing the penalty caused behavior to jump to the Pareto-superior equilibrium. Keywords: Equilibrium selection, framing, expressive law, experiments, coordination, prisoner's dilemma

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Paper provided by Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government in its series Working Paper Series with number rwp03-046.

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Date of creation: Nov 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp03-046

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C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. R. Cookson, 2000. "Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 55-79, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Robert Cooter, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
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  4. Lars Feld & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S., 1999. "The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Edward L. Glaeser & Spence Glendon, 1998. "Who Owns Guns? Criminals, Victims and the Culture of Violence," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1822, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  7. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S251-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Farrell, Joseph & Rabin, Matthew, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-18, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Sheffrin, S.M. & Triest, R.K., 1991. "Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance," Papers 373, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
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  13. William T. Harbaugh & Kate Krause & Lise Vesterlund, 2002. "Prospect Theory in Choice and Pricing Tasks," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2002-02, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 20 Aug 2007. [Downloadable!]
  14. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur & Offerman, Theo, 1998. "Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 143-161, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Akerlof, George A, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-75, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Pay Enough Or Don'T Pay At All," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Cachon, Gerard P & Camerer, Colin F, 1996. "Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 165-94, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, . "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers iewwp052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  22. Robert Cooter, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1051, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
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