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Information Transmission and Preference Similarity

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Author Info
Andreas Blume (Univ. of Iowa)
Abstract

This paper examines sets of Nash equilibria in sender-receiver games that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. Such stable sets exist. In {\em partial common interest games} they contain only informative equilibria. The stability requirement sharpens currently available predictions for such games by (1) weakening the partial common interest condition, (2) ruling out strictly dominated actions, (3) reflecting the informativeness of the sender's strategy in the receiver's reply, and (4) by ruling out pooling actions. This approach is then used as a step toward unifying the study of partial common interest games and of Crawford and Sobel's parametric model of preference similarity.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9605004.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 24 May 1996
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9605004

Note: Zipped using PKZIP v2.04, encoded using UUENCODE v5.15. Zipped file includes 1 file -- ui9603.wpa (Latex, 27 pages)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Steven A. Matthews & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Discussion Papers 892R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 32-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Blume, Andreas, 1996. "Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 2-25, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. repec:att:wimass:199218 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Yong Gwan Kim & Joel Sobel, 1992. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
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  8. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-67, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Matthew Rabin and Joel Sobel., 1993. "Deviations, Dynamics and Equilibrium Refinements," Economics Working Papers 93-211, University of California at Berkeley.
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